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Borders by Consent: A Proposal for Reducing





We describe a new consensual theory of borders and immigration that
reverses Peter Schuck's and Rogers Smith's notion of citizenship by
consent and posits that borders are legitimate and make sense only if
they are products of consent on the part of both countries on opposite sides
of them. Our approach, in turn, leads to differential borders that address
the many sovereignty and federalist problems inherent in border design
by a close examination of the policies that different borders for example,
the one between California and Mexico-need to serve in light of the
populations living nearby. We build on our work on border laws as
examples of Jacques Derrida's originary violence. We assert that laws
that exhibit a high degree of originary violence lead, almost ineluctably,
to actual violence and cruelty, such as that perpetrated by Donald
Trump's child-separation policy, and that consensual nd relatively open
borders are the most promising way to minimize both forms of violence,
originary and actual.
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that the underlying basis for a significant area of social regulation
fails badly when viewed from the perspective of any of the leading theories
of human organization and only holds appeal to those who are indifferent
about perpetrating pain and hardship on fellow humans and need a plausible
justification for doing so-namely that "they broke the law."'
Consider current U.S. border policy, which includes the following
elements, among others: a fixation on building long, expensive walls, 2 an
unfounded fear of outsiders as bearers of disease, crime, and social disorder,3
and a willingness to separate children from their parents as a means of
discouraging others from trying to enter even for the purpose of seeking
asylum.4
* John J. Sparkman Chair of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
**Professor and Clement Research Affiliate, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks
to Kevin Johnson, Leticia Saucedo, Shalini Ray, Amy Kimpel, Steven Bender, and Chisolm
Allenlundy for incisive suggestions and comments. Thanks, too, to the panelists and audience of
a session on Citizenship and Immigration of the 2020 annual meeting of Law & Society
Association, especially the convenor, Carrie Rosenbaum.
1. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS To RETHINK ITS
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 3 (2007) (observing that this is a common position); DANIEL
KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 6 (2012)
(same); Tara Law, Trump Says He'll Pause Deportation Raids for Two Weeks, Awaiting
Immigration 'Solution,' TIME (June 22, 2019), https://time.com/5612779/trump-deportations-
immigration/ [https://perma.cc/GJ8D-V3ER] (observing that unauthorized entrants deserve little
respect because "they broke the law").
2. See Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, Trump's Wall All You Need To Know About US
Border in Seven Charts, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-46824649 [https://perma.cc/V69E-F4LP].
3. See Gregory Korte & Alan Gomez, Trump Ramps Up Rhetoric on Undocumented
Aliens: "These Aren't People, These Are Animals," U.S.A. TODAY (May 16, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/20 1 8/05/16/trump-immigrants-animals-mexico-
democrats-sanctuary-cities/6 17252002/ [https://perma.cc/MU4M-4KLX] (noting the increase in
anti-immigrant rhetoric). On the "taboo" against open borders, see JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 10
16.
4. See Family Separation and Detention, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental legislative work/priorities policy/immig
ration/familyseparation [https://perma.cc/BCX8-H7LT] (describing the history and development
of this policy); see also JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 2 3 (same). Other countries are more
welcoming in their asylum policies, see STEVEN W. BENDER, RUN FOR THE BORDER: VICE AND
VIRTUE IN U.S.-MExICO BORDER CROSSINGS 1 (2012) (observing that current policy is harsh and
aimed at protecting national security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks); Patrick Kingsley, Is Trump's
America Tougher on Asylum than Other Western Countries?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/europe/trump-america-asylum-migration.html
[https://perma.cc/3JQ3-UWD9] (raising the possibility that some individuals like to exclude
others because they are insecure or irrationally fear that other people might hurt them; whereas
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Our premise is that this program, or any like it, is untenable under the three
dominant theories of social organization or, indeed, almost any other. It is
unappealing to many libertarians, who believe in relatively free movement of
people and goods.5 It is anathema to old-style conservatives, for many of the
same reasons as well as the large and costly governmental effort needed to
maintain it.6 And it appalls progressives because it inflicts unnecessary pain
on foreigners merely seeking a better life.'
A body of law that finds little support in existing theory begs for
reconsideration. This article examines weaknesses at the heart of current
immigration policy, suggests that the policy itself (as opposed to its
execution) is responsible for many of these deficiencies, and offers a new
direction.
Before proceeding, a preliminary observation about the current state of
immigration scholarship: We believe that much work in this area-including
our own-has paid too little attention to basic questions of institutional
design.8 Writers have often focused on pointing out defects in particular
features of immigration practice such as the plenary power doctrine;9
demonstrating that certain practices are fueled by animus;'0 or challenging
many of a different disposition favor including other people because they probably have
something to offer).
5. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 9 (making the case for relatively free movement across
borders); infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See KANSTROOM, supra note 1, at 3 5 (noting the personal cost o those deported and
their friends and family); infra Part I.C.
8. For example, in Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Rebuke: Originary Violence and U.S.
Border Policy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 33, 39 40 (2019),
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/oniline/53/files/53-online-Delgado-Rebuke.pdf [https://perma.
cc/94YG-4LZ3] [hereinafter Rebuke], one of us (Delgado) pointed out two forms of violence that
shadow immigration laws and rules but did not go on to explore the role of borders in stoking the
two forms of conflict. Nor did his article address why we have borders at all. As we shall see,
they are often associated with trouble, cost, violence, and racism. So why not retire them as far as
we can? To be sure, a few scholars address borders, but only historically for the role they have
played in various periods-or descriptively, e.g., hard or soft. But few subject them to searching
conceptual or functional analysis of the kind we hope to start that is, an approach that subjects
the frame to critical analysis, not just the parts.
9. See Richard Delgado, JAccuse: An Essay on Animus, 52 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. ONLINE
119, 142 (2018), https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/online/vo152/52-online-Delgado.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HXA-LLGV] (criticizing this feature in the work of several scholars);
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 16 18 (same).
10. Delgado, supra note 9, at 127 40 (discussing a number of writers who take a mild,
procedural approach to Executive action fueled by animus); see also Allegra M. McLeod,
Immigration, Criminalization, and Disobedience, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 556, 556 (2016)
(lamenting that "seeking greater procedural protections for immigrants ... is woefully incomplete
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particularly abhorrent measures uch as family separation, travel bans,
restrictions on seeking asylum, or detention facilities that lack provision for
basic human needs." A few have questioned federal supremacy and outlined
a role for states in border enforcement. 12
Although all these efforts are helpful, even valiant, they have not gone
deep enough. A program for reforming border policy should begin by
positing a framework for borders that makes sense in political and human
terms. In other words, examining borders and their reasons for being should
carry at least equal weight along with micro-criticism of particular policies.3
as a vision of immigration justice... [and is] unlikely to change... the plight of the millions of
people without a path to lawful status.").
11. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Lessons from Mexico Folklore: An Essay
on U.S. Immigration Policy, Child Separation, and La Llorona, 81 U. PITT. L. REV. 287, 294 98
(2020) (criticizing family separation but not examining the conceptual framework whence it
derives); Kari Hong, Weaponizing Misery: The 20-Year Attack on Asylum, 22 LEwIS & CLARK L.
REV. 541 (2018) (finding fault with cutbacks in asylum law and practice); Stacy A. Tovino, The
Grapes of Wrath: On the Health of Immigration Detainees, 57 B.C. L. REV. 167, 169 (2016)
(deploring dangerous conditions in detention facilities); Fatma Marouf et al., The Overlooked
Legal Challenge to Trump's Travel Ban, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (April 23, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-overlooked-legal-challenge-to-trumps-travel-ban/
[https://perma.cc/MV6D-ZAKK] (criticizing the travel ban).
12. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REv. 788, 792 (2008) (discussing the role of federalism in immigration policy);
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 5 (same). Recently, President Trump has announced that he favors
allowing states to take a hardline position on admitting refugees into their territory, Executive
Order on Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355
(Sept. 26, 2019), and he threatened to terminate federal grants to states that refused to cooperate
with harsh efforts to enforce border policy, including turning over state prisoners to federal
immigration authorities. See Peter Margulies, Deconstructing "Sanctuary Cities": The Legality
of Federal Grant Conditions that Require State and Local Cooperation on Immigration
Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1507 (2018).
13. For examples of such micro-challenges, see Rebuke, supra note 8 and accompanying
text. Even when successful, challenges that aim only at incremental progress tend to be swallowed
up by forces emanating from other parts of the broader regime of which they are a part, or by
simple co-optation. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v.
Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547,
549 (1995) (discussing a "reconstructive paradox" that limits gains achieved by a single
breakthrough). Recently, scholars and activists have been eschewing reform-of the criminal
justice system for example and aiming at abolition. See, e.g., V. Noah Gimbel & Craig
Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence Through Abolition Democracy,
40 CARDozo L. REv. 1453 (2019); Dorothy Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2019); Symposium, 105 GEO. L.J. 1405 passim (issue 6) (2015 16) (discussing
carceral and criminal-justice reform in broad terms). See Gerald P. Lopez, Transform Don'tJust
Tinker with Legal Education, 24 CLINICAL L. REv. 247 (2018) in regards to reform in legal
education. In the area of reform in immigration, see Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez,
Opinion, Abolish Immigration Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/opinion/immigration-detention-
BORDERS BY CONSENT
As we hope to show, any searching inquiry is likely to lead to a regime of
differentiated and more flexible borders than the current one between the
United States and Mexico.4
In Part I, we discuss the drawbacks of today's regime of highly guarded
borders under three of the most widely held political theories. In Part II, we
put forward a theory of borders by consent. In Part III, we discuss two forms
of violence, originary and consequential, and show how border regimes,
particularly if they are nonconsensual, can easily increase both. Part IV
critiques a common argument in favor of maj oritarian rule and citizenship by
consent, namely that the citizens of an area are entitled to limit admission to
whomever they favor. Parts V and VI show how our proposed approach leads
to democratic, highly differentiated borders reflecting the wants and needs of
the people living on both sides of them, and sketches how this is more or less
the current situation regarding the U.S. border with Canada. A short
Conclusion summarizes the argument for borders by consent.
prison.html?action click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage [https://penia.cc/Q842-
AQ79]; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Abolish ICE Movement Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (July 30, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/abolish-ice-
movement-explained [https://perma.cc/CTP7-VBJL]. With many broad areas, such as
immigration, it is easy for the scholar or activist to expend all his or her energy attacking a single
feature of a wicked scheme, leaving the framework intact, or even find himself or herself co-opted
by a federal system that is perfectly content to find a place for her within the system, which
continues as before. See, e.g., Leonard Pitts Jr., Opinion, Combat he Evil at the Border, SEATTLE
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/combat-the-evil-at-the-border/
[https://perma.cc/T4E4-M4RS] (suggesting that lawyers eager to defend immigrants pro bono
sign up for a Justice Department list maintained by the current administration); see infra Part
III.C.4 (positing that scholars and activists who are drawn to challenging the conditions of
confinement but not the regime of which those conditions are a part may be evincing a
"missionary" complex that pays scant heed to the wrongful scheme that repeatedly necessitates
the rescues in the first place).
14. See infra Parts V and VI; see also JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 45 86 (reviewing history
of U.S. immigration law and highlighting its frequent restrictionist enor). A number of scholars
have put forward the case for open borders. See, e.g., TERESA HAYTER, OPEN BORDERS: THE CASE
AGAINST IMMIGRATION CONTROLS (2004); JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 6. Although we agree with
most of what these authors say, their position is not our own, namely that borders should be
consensual, thus flexible and responsive to the wishes of both political entities on either side of
them. The reader interested in how the U.S. border shifted and grew in response to various
struggles and pressures during the period of 1830 1910 may wish to consult STEVEN HAHN, A
NATION WITHOUT BORDERS: THE UNITED STATES AND ITS WORLD IN AN AGE OF CIVIL WARS,
1830 1910 (2016); JULIAN LIm, POROUS BORDERS: MULTIRACIAL MIGRATIONS AND THE LAW IN
THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDERLANDS (2017) (tracing how early border crossing was both informal
and disorderly, especially with the advent of the railroad, which brought immigrants of many
types into contact with each other for the first time); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION 19 97 (1996) (observing that for much of U.S. history federal control over
immigration was lax and sporadic but that the states exercised considerable control via vagrancy
law, quarantine laws, and the law of slavery).
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I. CITIZENSHIP BY CONSENT: HIGHLY GUARDED BORDERS UNDER
THREE THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
A. Libertarians
In a state of nature, people would wander where their will and destiny took
them, without regard for others' pre-existing occupation of nearby land,
except for what a respect for privacy and investment in crops, cattle, or
residential settlement required.5 The resulting regime of relatively open
borders would also promote economic development inasmuch as it allows
people and jobs to find each other without unnecessary obstacles.6 Most
advanced countries, the United States included, have plenty of open land, so
that newcomers need not settle where they are not wanted.
Some scholars, such as Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith, have proposed
that citizenship presupposes consent, which is true.' But they neglect to ask
how the right to insist upon consent to someone's mere relocation across a
given line arises. Unless the traveler has agreed to grant the residents of a
region the right to exclude him, it would seem that the traveler has a pre-
existing right to relocate there, just as he has the right to move an arm or a
leg to a new position on a bed or couch. Merely repeating that the citizens of
a region, by virtue of residing there, have a right to exclude newcomers is to
15. See Bas van der Vossen, Libertarianism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward
N. Zalta et al. eds., Spring 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/
[https://perma.cc/M8WH-N4LA] (defining the term); see also David Schmidtz, Friedrich Hayek,
in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., Spring 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friedrich-hayek/ [https://perma.cc/9WW7-SSLA] (arguing that
social justice is just a mirage); F. A. Hayek, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM passim (1944) (same).
16. See Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251
(1987); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11, at 296 98; Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration
Equation, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/magazine/the-
immigration-equation.html [https://perma.cc/B7JB-5CV6]; see also JOHNSON, supra note 1, at
131 67 (discussing economic benefits of immigration); Emily Badger, Children of Poor
Immigrants Rise, Regardless of Where They Come From, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/upshot/immigration-america-rise-poor.html
[https ://perma.cc/PT7D-UZ2D] (same).
17. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLICY (1985) (arguing that citizenship is inherently consensual so that
the children of undocumented aliens should not receive birthright citizenship); Peter Schuck &
Rogers Smith, Two Yale Professors Argue Against the Concept of Citizenship Without Consent,
SOC. CONT. 19 20 (Fall 1996), https://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/seven-one/consent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AE8R-QBKL] (summarizing their argument); see also ROGERS M. SMITH,
CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (reviewing early
U.S. history of citizenship rules and showing that exclusion and an illiberal impulse dominated
much of this period).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
BORDERS BY CONSENT
beg the question, who gave them that right? Surely not the traveler, but then
who? The answer might seem to be the residents themselves. But then the
traveler believes he or she has the right to move across a region, too, so unless
he is the bearer of a communicable disease, has a history of stealing things,
or wants to pitch his tent right next to someone living there so that they would
be living cheek to jowl, the two rights-those of the residents and those of
the would-be newcomers-would appear to cancel each other out. 8
And since most emigrants have something to offer-a talent, a trade, a
skill-any region that imposed unnecessary limitations on the ability of
outsiders to enter would pay a price.19 Anyone who doubts this is invited to
compare regions such as the U.S. South, which has relatively little social
mobility and immigration,z0 and the Northeast or California,2' which have a
great deal. There, newcomers eager to make homes in the region readily find
jobs, even if only mowing lawns for a living, and send their kids to excellent
public schools.22 Others open small businesses uch as a restaurant or a tailor
shop. Their children move up. Some of the newcomers help working couples
by tending their children or doing housecleaning. The couple's children learn
Spanish or another foreign language and become comfortable with people of
different backgrounds. A region that believes it has a right to exclude
newcomers and exercises it often will find itself lagging behind ones that
welcome immigrants-and not in economic terms alone, but in cultural
diversity, better food, better music, better services, and a cosmopolitan spirit.
18. See infra notes 32 33 and accompanying text, discussing commonsense limitations to a
regime of relatively open borders.
19. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 6 7, 168 99 (discussing the benefits of relatively open
immigration). Of course, some would-be entrants would turn out to be hardened criminals and
bearers of infectious diseases. See infra notes 28 30 and accompanying text (noting that these
individuals would be denied entry). Most, however, would benefit the region where they settle.
See Lowenstein, supra note 16 (observing that immigrants generally boost the economy in the
regions where they settle); Badger, supra note 16 (same); A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, How Latinos
Saved American Cities, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/1 1/08/how-latinos-saved-american-cities/
[https://perma.cc/3UGQ-DACF].
20. See Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (June 17,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/EF3A-L2CB] (discussing the distribution of immigrants nationwide); see also
Alana Semuels, Why It's So Hard To Get Ahead in the South, ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/south-mobility-charlotte/521763/
[https://perma.cc/6SNY-385G].
21. Radford, supra note 20.
22. Excellent, at least, compared to those in the sending countries.
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B. Traditional Conservatives
Libertarians, then, preferring as they do human freedom and as little
regulation as possible, would seem to incline toward relatively open
borders.23 For the same reason, so would traditional conservatives, who value
individual autonomy and distrust big government.24 Borders require walls,
watchtowers, electronic monitoring, and police. They require identity cards
and officers to issue, inspect, and validate them. They require rules and
inspectors to govern the shipment of goods into and out of the region in
question. Tightly regulated borders are not an economic conservative's stock
in trade, especially when one adds to this the burden they place on the
economy of a region that insists on them.25 As well, traditional conservatives
distrust change that comes too quickly, believing that it can disrupt settled
expectations and drive up the costs of transactions and behavior. 26 A program
like Trump's that instituted a dozen measures aimed at making immigration
harder all in a short period would collide with a basic conservative principle.2
23. See supra Part I.A.
24. See Andy Hamilton, Conservatism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta
et al eds., Spring 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conservatism/ [https://perma.cc/6Z9W-
XGLC] (defining the term).
25. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
26. See Stephen Stromberg, Opinion, Why Baby Boomers' Grandchildren Will Hate Them,
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opirions/2019/09/17/why-baby-
boomers-grandchildren-will-hate-them/?wpisrc=nl most&wpmm=1 [https://perma.cc/6FAR-
DVDY] (observing that "[i]n its most compelling form, conservatism counsels against ambitious
reform and for the preservation of economic arrangements, social structures and mores to which
people had become accustomed, because trying to sweep away too much, too quickly, results in
backlash, disorder and civil conflict more harm than good. In this view, steady evolution in
policy and culture, in part via generational change, is preferable to rapid, large-scale reform.
Ascribing this instinct to conservatives who oppose acting aggressively on global warming is one
way to give them some benefit of the doubt that they are not knowingly and selfishly condemning
future generations to climate hell.").
27. See Tyler Anbinder, Trump Has Spread More Hatred of Immigrants than Any American
in History, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-has-
spread-more-hatred-of-immigrants-than-any-american-in-history/2019/11/07/7e253236-ff54-
l1e9-bab-0fc209e065a8 story.html [https://perma.cc/E3KQ-67GN]; supra note 11 and
accompanying text. But see SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 17; SMITH, supra note 17 (noting that
an illiberal impulse dominated much of our history). During both world wars, the U.S. employed
"braceros," temporary workers to perform farm labor. See KELLY LYTLE HERNANDEZ, MIGRA!: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL (2010) (discussing this program and noting that it found




Nor do tightly guarded borders appeal to most progressives or liberals. 28
People want to cross borders for reasons that include urgent human need-to
escape violence, to reunite with a family already living on the other side, or
to make a better living.2 9 Rejecting or locking them up when they enter inflicts
acute pain.0 Progressives naturally want the world to contain as little of this
as possible, hence are temperamentally and ideologically inclined toward
relatively porous borders, allowing of course for rules restricting the entrance
of criminals and those harboring communicable diseases.3
If tightly regulated borders are not inherent in the nature of things nor
attractive to adherents of any of the most common theories of social
regulation, what approach could be better?
II. BORDERS BY CONSENT
Behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,3 2 one might ponder a regime in
which both regions on opposite sides of any border strive to maximize their
interests and those of their citizens.3 Because, as we have seen, relatively
28. See DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM,
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016 DNC Platform.pdf
[https ://perma.cc/57JD-2KZE].
29. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11, at 292 94; see also HAYTER, supra fote 14, at 64
133 (asserting that limitations on refugees are particularly indefensible); E. Tendayi Achiume,
Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1510 (2010) (noting that colonialism often
entails forcible displacement of populations for the benefit of a more powerful colonial society;
this displacement "obligates former colonial powers to open their borders to former colonial
subjects" because even if these are economic migrants seeking better opportunities they are
"political agents exercising equality rights [through] 'decolonial' migration."); Why Do People
Immigrate to the US?, USAFACTS (May 24, 2018), https://usafacts.org/reports/immigration
[https ://perma.cc/GC5J-WPA6].
30. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 87 130 (arguing for liberalized immigration rules); Delgado
& Stefancic, supra note 11, at 291 98.
31. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 87 130 (discussing who would be admitted and who
rejected); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11.
32. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 13 (rev. ed. 2011) (describing the "veil of
ignorance," under which lawmakers would enact rules unaware of what position they would
occupy under those rules).
33. See BENDER, supra note 4, at 1 3 (observing that current policy is not a product of
mutual negotiation between the United States and Mexico and urging a jointly negotiated one in
the future). A certain amount of informal mixing is already happening in regions like El Paso and
San Diego, whose economies and cultural life are closely tied with those of their counterparts just
over the border. See, e.g., Veronica Escobar, Opinion, El Paso, Two Weeks Later, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/opinion/el-paso-shooting-funeral.html
[https ://perma.cc/9JPP-U4T4].
52:0337]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
open borders are desirable under most political theories3 4 and offer economic
benefits to both the sending and the receiving nation,35 the outcome of any
such negotiation is likely to be a border that is considerably more porous than
the current ones.36 Because of federalist concerns, border regimes selected
At times, the informal connection spans thousands of miles, extending from a northern U.S.
city all the way to a town in southern Mexico. See Nina Shapiro, Life After Deportation, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/life-after-deportation-a-
family -with-roots-in-the-seattle-region-starts-over-in-
mexico/?utm source=marketingcloud&utm medium email&utm campaign=Deportation+Don
%27t+Miss+(BUTTON)+09-22-2019 9 22 2019&utm term=Active%20subscriber#comments
[https://perma.cc/YTJ5-C5BP]; see also BENDER, supra note 4, at 141 93 (discussing the
inevitability of U.S.-Mexico economic and cultural integration); RAWLS, supra note 32, at 3
("Policymakers must accept the reality that whatever is needed or desired in one country
historically will be supplied by the other, despite government efforts to the contrary."); infra Part
V (describing how the U.S. border with Canada exhibits a high degree of social and economic
integration in communities along both sides of it).
34. See supra Part I.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 19 22; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW 72 (1991), which notes that Western counties that adopt "open range" rules
governing cattle that damage crops, versus "closed range" rules, find that farmers and ranchers
generally arrive at the same solution: They cooperate inbuilding and maintaining fences to protect
the crops and share the costs. By the same token, fluid borders arrived at by consent and
negotiation would seem close to the natural and optimal outcome, both economically and in terms
of improving friendly relations. City dwellers often end up sharing driveways or parking spaces
by tacit or mutual consent, for much the same reason, sometimes on alternating or agreed-upon
days or schedule of hours.
36. See EUROPE WITHOUT BORDERS: REMAPPING TERRITORY, CITIZENSHIP, AND IDENTITY
IN A TRANSNATIONAL AGE, at vii viii (Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain eds., 2003) (noting that
since the advent of the European Union in 1992, national identity, borders, and sovereignty have
been dissolving throughout hat continent, more calmly than most people expected). Of course,
some seem to be re-establishing themselves, as with England in the age of Brexit. See Craig
Calhoun, The Democratic Integration of Europe, EuROzINE (June 21, 2004),
https://www.eurozine.com/the-democratic-integration-of-europe/ [https://perma.cc/PB4Z-
M5YF] (observing that when borders between nations dissolve, it is generally a product of
choice). Much of modern law has been trending toward negotiation, both in private law for
example, the movement toward mediation in civil dispute resolution and in public law for
example, the movement toward commercial alliances among nations and, internally, toward the
increasing use of referendums to promote a democratic spirit. See, e.g., Switzerland's Political
System and Government, ALL ABOUT SWITZERLAND, http://swiss-government-politics.all-about-
switzerland.info/ [https://perma.cc/6JV2-QFC6]. Why, then, has the United States not opted for
negotiated, and relatively more open, borders with its neighbors? See infra Part III.A (discussing
originary violence as one possible reason); supra text accompanying note 5; infra text
accompanying note 104 12 (discussing racism in the operation of U.S. immigration policy and
social life in general). A final reason, for some, is religion and the belief in America's unique
divine place and destiny. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, Why Evangelicals Like Rick Perry Believe that
Trump Is God's Messenger, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2019) (noting that some evangelicals believe
that America just as it is-is special and that, presumably, any change in its culture and
character would be for the worse); see also Vice News, Trump and His Allies Think He Was Sent
by God To Be President, YouTUBE (Nov. 27, 2019),
[Ariz. St. LT
BORDERS BY CONSENT
this way would likely vary, with different U.S. states maintaining a degree of
autonomy from all the others,37 and all of them sharing power with the federal
government in areas requiring that the nation speak with a single voice.38
A. The Rawlsian Negotiation
Let us imagine that one region in Nation A has a surplus of excellent
farmers, while a different region just across the border in Nation B has many
surgeons and doctors. Both nations of course contain practitioners of many
other professions and lines of work, but let us focus for a moment on just
these two.39 Imagine a surgeon from Nation B who performs ten operations a
week and mows his lawn on Sunday. If he is able to hire an excellent gardener
from Nation A to mow his lawn, he is able to perform an additional operation.
His patients, his lawn, and his pocketbook benefit. Nation A benefits as well.
The former farmer-turned-gardener is no longer underemployed, is able to
send money home to his village and family, and receives an excellent letter
of recommendation from the surgeon when, having learned English, he is
ready to move on to his next job.
This example, which we have borrowed from a business reporter who, in
turn, borrowed it from leading labor economists,40 shows how relatively open
borders can easily benefit both nations on either side of them. The idea is a
familiar one in economic thought and builds on the notion of comparative
advantage, which is a staple of trade theory.4'
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLtfq4blSll [htlps://perma.cc/63DY-KVL2] (displaying
numerous video clips regarding the belief that Trump was sent by God).
37. See infra text accompanying Part II.C.
38. See infra text accompanying Part II.C (describing how federalism and federal
supremacy limit state autonomy).
39. See Lowenstein, supra note 16 (discussing a similar example).
40. Id.
41. The United States makes excellent TV sets and computers. Mexico produces excellent
tomatoes. If both countries are able to sell these products to each other freely, both are better off.
Mexico (which is capable of producing electronic products, but only inferior ones at his stage of
their development) gets very good TV sets and computers. The United States (which is capable
of producing its own tomatoes, but not as good as those Mexico produces) gets excellent tomatoes
at a good price. See Comparative Advantage, ECON. ONLINE,
https://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Global economics/Comparative advantage.html
[https://perma.cc/836A-9E9J] (explaining the term); see also BENDER, supra note 4, at 2
(asserting that most immigrants come for compelling reasons and confer benefits on the new
country).
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B. Examples: Some Options for California and Mexico
It is impossible to predict specifically what might emerge from the kind of
negotiation sketched above; probably each pair of border states would arrive
at a slightly different bargain. We invite the reader to speculate on what
measures California might consider plausible and desirable if it were able to
negotiate those measures with Mexico.
42
1. California Issues "Blue Cards"
If Mexico agreed, California might issue Mexicans "blue cards" that
would entitle them to live and work in that state, own property, run
businesses, and do anything else that legal residents (green-card holders) can
now do anywhere in the United States. California could use its own standards,
which would presumably be set with an eye to its needs and culture.43
These cards would operate similarly to the green cards (lawful immigrant
status) that federal authorities now issue to immigrants who satisfy certain
conditions, including a long waiting period. A California-issued blue card
would not, however, enable the holder to leave the state, unless a second state
agreed to honor it.
42. California is a good example for our purposes. First, it has a border with Mexico. That
border came about through a war and so exemplifies originary violence, some of which has abated
over the years. See infra Part III.A. It has deemed itself a sanctuary state and allows immigrants
to obtain drivers licenses. Andrea Castillo, California Driver's License Program for Those Here
Illegally Surpasses 1 Million Drivers, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-dmv-illegal-immigration-licenses-20180404-
story.html [https://perma.cc/TRP4-9TN3]. It might well, therefore, offer itself for a trial at a new
renegotiated border along the lines discussed below.
43. See Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67
STAN. L. REV. 869 (2015) (proposing a similar measure); see also KENTA. ONO & JOHN L. SLOOP,
SHIFTING BORDERS: RHETORIC, IMMIGRATION, AND CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 187 (2002)
(acknowledging the tradition of anti-immigrant rhetoric in that state but noting that the concept
of the border there shifts and changes over the years); Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering
the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395, 1405 06 (1997)
(observing that California cities such as Monterey Park exhibit struggles as well as solidarity
between and among immigrant minority groups); Gerald Neuman, Lost Century of American
Immigration Law (1776 1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1835 n.7 (1993) (noting that early in
our history the colonies regulated immigration and that all immigration during that period was
"local"). On the role of states as laboratories for innovation, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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2. California Recognizes a Local Form of Citizenship
California could recognize an even higher status that would permit holders
to vote in state elections and attend local universities on par with U.S. citizens
who were also California residents.44 Mexico would presumably reciprocate
by offering favorable terms for Californians seeking a simple document that
would allow them to reside in that country-as retirees, tourists, or investors,
for example.
3. Federal Powers To Regulate National Taxation, Military Draft,
and Rules Relating to Interstate Commerce and Travel
Under either of the two new regimes (blue card, California citizen), all
federal rules and prerogatives would remain in effect. The blue card holder
or California-Mexico dual citizen would pay U.S. income taxes, register and
be subject to the military draft, and be punishable for violating any federal
criminal statues, such as for human trafficking or selling illicit substances.
4. Illustration: A Re-drawn Map Illustrating a California "Insert"
and Border.
The U.S.-California-Mexico border, then, would look like this:
44. Markowitz, supra note 43, at 869 70 (noting that "prevailing interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment leave[ ] untouched the historic power of the states to define the
boundaries of their own political communities more generously than the federal government" and
arguing that "such state citizenship schemes could deliver substantial tangible support for the
integration of undocumented immigrants [and serve as] a powerful expressive tool for states to
reorient our national conversation on immigration").
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C. Differential Borders and State Autonomy the Role of Federalism
In an ideal world, then, a state like California would be free to negotiate
and bargain for a set of border rules with a foreign neighbor, such as Mexico.
Would not the federal government, situated in Washington, D.C., have some
say in the matter? Certainly. The federal government would be able to tax
every resident of California just as before, including any newcomers who
make it into that state under the new regime.45 The feds would also be able to
45. For example, a law-abiding Mexican passed California's scrutiny and received a "blue
card." California, then, would, in effect, have two borders. See, e.g., Karla Adam et al., Boris
Johnson Offers a New Brexit Plan, New Suspension of Parliament, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/prime-minister-boris-johnson-to-set-out-take-it-
or-leave-it-brexit-proposal/2019/10/02/8ed6dc5c-e45f- 11e9-b0a6-
3d03721b85ef story.html?wpisrc=nl todayworld&wpmm= 1 [https://perma.cc/9VJU-GFGV]
(describing a Brexit plan under which England and Ireland would have two separate borders).
Different U.S. states today may end up having different border regimes by virtue of judicial
rulings. See Maria Sacchetti, Federal Court Issues Split Decision, Allowing Trump's Latest





prosecute the newcomers for violating federal laws, such as failure to register
for the draft, nonpayment of federal income taxes, or selling illicit drugs,
46
just as Mexico would for American emigrts who violate its laws while living
there.
In this respect, the border between Mexico and the United States would
remain exactly the same. All regulatory roles that the federal authorities
previously exercised-taxation, military regulation, policing for federal
crimes-would remain in effect. What would change is the right of entry
from Mexico to California and vice versa. California would enforce the right
under rules it would negotiate with Mexico. Those deemed admissible could
live in that state, work, and travel freely. If they wanted to leave the state for
Oregon or Nevada, for example, they would need to apply under any rules
that the other state negotiated with their country of origin or with California.4
mexico/2019/08/16/cbObgf0c-c046-11e9-9b73-fd3c65ef8f9c story.html [https://perma.cc/JP8R-
RRR6].
46. In these areas, federal law would remain supreme. Suppose, however, that California
and Mexico agreed to a more restrictive immigration scheme than the federal one? This seems
unlikely, but the resulting scheme would need to survive analysis under existing pre-emption law,
which it might easily fail to do if it interfered with a key federal policy, such as free trade or a
federally established program to increase the labor supply in specific trades or professions, such
as the current EBV (Employment Based Visas) program. See Employment Based Visas, EB5 INV.,
https://www.eb5investors.com/visa-information/employment-based-visas
[https://perma.cc/CJST-PPRU]. For one governor who actually declared that he wished for an
even more fortified border between his state (Texas) and Mexico, see Antonia Blumberg,
Mistakes Were Made' in Immigrant Rhetoric Before El Paso Shooting, HUFFPOST (Aug. 29,
2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/greg-abbott-fundraising-letter-el-
paso n 5d68663ee4b0488c0dllea19?ncid=newsltushpmgnews TheMorningEmail 083019
&guccounter=2 [https://perma.cc/RUH9-LFWW]. On the possibility that the federal government
might attempt to prevent a state like California from adopting a more immigrant-friendly
regime within its own borders-than the one favored by the current Administration, see
GILBERT G. GONZALEZ, CULTURE OF EMPIRE: AMERICAN WRITERS, MEXICO, AND MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS, 1880 1930 185 (2004) (noting that powerful corporations and U.S. military
detachments throughout much of history set immigration in motion by intervening violently in
Latin America); Margulies, supra note 12, at 1508 09. If federal authorities attempted to detain
Mexicans who had entered California legally under that state's rules, invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1325
(2019) (unlawful entry), California's answer would be either that such an immigrant's settling
there was lawful or more sweepingly that immigrants had not crossed the U.S. border at all.
47. It might be argued that the federal government would then be responsible for policing
California's border with other U.S. states, which is a great deal longer than California's border
with Mexico. Additionally, the federal government would have to selectively police federal lands
within California, which would present a logistical challenge. These objections are relatively easy
to answer. The federal government currently is saddled with policing the western border of
California, which is a sea border and fairly hard and expensive to police. After the change we
advocate came into play, it would no longer have to police the western (sea) border that would
be California's responsibility-just the land border on California's east. And nothing would
prevent the federal government from policing federal lands, such as Yosemite, just as it can now.
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III. ORIGINARY VIOLENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
As we have seen, the case for open borders seems straightforward. Major
political theories favor them,48 and they are likely to benefit countries on both
sides.49 And yet, many people find closed borders attractive enough that they
are willing to accept the hardship and economic inefficiency that they
introduce.5 0 An examination of border policies in light of an insight by a
prominent social theorist explains why this is so and yet why the case for
relatively open borders nevertheless remains compelling.
A. Originary and Ordinary Violence
Originary violence, a concept introduced by Jacques Derrida and
discussed briefly by Derrick Bell, describes a type of threshold coercion that
differs from the kind most legal scholars examine?' Imagine an everyday
example. Suppose that I leave a note on your door one day, identifying myself
as a neighbor living down the block. Some of us have become concerned
As this article was going to press, Donald Trump offered states the option of adopting an even
harsher view of at least one category of immigrants, namely those seeking asylum, including the
option of refusing to accept them altogether. Chris Witte, Trump Gave States the Power To Ban
Refugees. Conservative Utah Wants More of Them., WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/trump-gave-states-the-power-to-ban-refugees-
conservative -utah-wants-more -of-them/20 1 9/12/02/d8deTb00-1085-1 lea-a533 -
90aTbecf7713 story.html?utm campaign=politics am&utm medium=Email&utm source=Ne
wsletter&wpisrc=nl politics&wpmm l [https://perma.cc/CS2Z-QBHM]. One state, Utah,
replied that it actually wished to have more (not fewer) of them. Id.
48. See supra Part I.A C.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Donald Trump, President of the United States, Address on Modernizing Our
Immigration System for a Stronger America (May 16, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-modernizing-
immigration-system-stronger-ameica/ [https://perma.cc/29S4-4G7G]; see also NICK VAUGHAN-
WILLIAMS, BORDER POLITICS: TIHE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGN POWER 32 34, 65 91 (2009) (noting
the resistance many feel to altering the idea of a fixed territorial border that is the basis of national
sovereignty and security); SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 17, at 90 103 (same); SMITH, supra note
17, at 470 504 (noting the same resistance).
51. Jacques Derrida (1930 2004), ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOS.,
https://www.iep.utm.edu/derrida/ [https://perma.cc/3U9N-CJWV]; 1 WALTER BENJAMIN,
Critique of Violence, in WALTER BENJAMIN SELECTED WRITINGS 236, 236 52 (1921) (discussing
the authority of law as an assertion of originary violence). Derrick Bell mentions the concept in
the last edition of his casebook. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 600 (6th
ed. 2008). Other authors have commented on much the same idea but employing differing
terminology. See SIMONE WEL, THE ILIAD OR THE POEM OF FORCE: A CRITICAL EDITION 71 105
(James P. Holoka ed. & trans., 2003) (analyzing the famous poem to show that its true lesson is
that force enslaves man, shrinks his flesh, blinds the perpetrator, and deforms the spirit of
everyone in the vicinity).
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about crime in our area and have formed a neighborhood watch with the aim
of combating it. One of the measures we are trying to get everyone to carry
out is cutting back hedges sharply so that criminals casing the area or
pondering a break-in won't be able to hide. We tell you that your hedges are
too high and offer to come back tomorrow and trim them ourselves if you
don't want to do it. We make plain that somebody has to do it or trouble will
follow.52
The first act-my note announcing the neighborhood watch with designs
on your hedges-is a case of originary violence. You become aware of it
when we declare that you must do what we have said or trouble will follow.
A different kind of violence may set in later, when we do show up at your
yard and start cutting.53
Immigration laws and policies are aspects of originary violence.5 ' Border
enforcement pursuant to those laws and policies is a case of ordinary
violence.
Legal agents perform ordinary violence when they cut down your hedges
without your permission, or fine you for not registering a bicycle, or
vaccinating your dog against rabies. They also perform a kind of
psychological violence when they hold the threat of punishment over you,
even if you are a law-abiding citizen who has no objection to doing any of
these things.
Originary violence is different. It arises when a government agent of some
kind announces an intention to rule-to enforce rules of one kind or another
for everyone in a certain region. In the example of the neighborhood watch,
it arises when I leave you the abovementioned note advising you of our
52. See Rebuke, supra note 8, at 40.
53. See id.
54. See Richard Delgado, Law's Violence: Derrick Bell's Next Article, 75 U. PITT. L. REv.
435, 436 (2014) (discussing a similar example) [hereinafter Violence]; Rebuke, supra note 8
(same); see also SARAH SONG, IMMIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 56 57 (2019) (noting that "the
state creates a people by exercising its coercive power over individuals in a territory"); VAUGHAN-
WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 66 72 (taking issue with the view that borders between states are
"harmless 'fences between neighbors"' and observing that a root word for territory is "terrere,
which means to frighten or terrorize," so that a territory is "land occupied by and bounded by
violence," directed both at those who are ruled within and those who are excluded). Our example
of hedges is a stand-in for borders. Both impede free choice, excite dissension, and invite efforts
to penetrate them by those who feel excluded.
55. The violence arises when the citizen thinks "I cannot do that anymore the way I used
to." The citizen suffers loss of autonomy as well as fear over the consequences of a breach, even
an inadvertent one.
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intention to modify everyone's hedges, including yours, because they are too
tall. 56
Acts of this type (originary violence) precede the kind of coercion
(ordinary violence) that officials visit on those who violate their edicts. And
in most legal systems, the trappings of what we call due process-hearings,
transcripts, rights to an attorney, and so on-arise only in connection with
this second (ordinary) type of violence." And one of the purposes of these
trappings is to turn attention away from the initial act (originary) of violence
and persuade everyone to go along with it, as uncomplainingly as possible
and believing themselves good citizens for doing so. 58
From this perspective, then, violence comes first and legality (what we
call justice) later, and not the other way around.9 To see how this is so,
consider an account (only partly allegorical) of how countries come into
being.
B. Originary Violence
Immigration regimes come into play only once a group of people decide
to declare themselves a country. Often this happens once they win a war
against a neighboring group or, if they start out as colonies, against the home
country. The new nation marks its border with a line on a map and signs,
barriers, and watchtowers on the ground. Often they deploy men with guns at
the ready to fend off anyone trying to enter without permission.6' They also
56. See Violence, supra note 54, at 437 (positing that originary violence sets in "when the
law first announces itself and [explains] ... its intentions," namely to rule the populace); supra
notes 50 51 and accompanying text (explaining the contents of my note).
57. Rebuke, supra note 8, at 40.
58. Id.
59. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)
(observing that much of legal interpretation is violent). Violence of both kinds is deplorable,
often inexcusable, and damages the spirit of both its victims and those who perpetrate it. See
WEIL, supra note 51 (describing the role of force in structuring and demeaning human
relations). Are the two forms of violence originary and ordinary connected? Not
conceptually, we think; one could, theoretically, have the one without the other. But originary
violence that takes the form of harsh rhetoric "the border is here, damn it!"-almost always
leads to laws ("don't you dare try crossing without our permission") or policies ("no Asians
need apply"), followed by actual violence ("you broke our law put your hands behind your
back"), in connection with enforcement of the laws. As ordinary citizens witness the above, one
will likely see a rise in hate crimes and hate speech against Latinos or other demonized
groups which we have seen in the Trump era increasing the amount of ordinary violence
expended on the targeted group.
60. Violence, supra note 54, at 444; Rebuke, supra note 8, at 41 (recounting much the same
story of origin); VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 51-61 (noting much the same
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make plain to domestic groups dissatisfied with the new regime-indigenous
people, for example-that he authorities will use force to move them out of
the way if they cause trouble.6' Control over the borders strikes everyone as
a vital ingredient of nationhood and cultural identity-as Donald Trump
keeps reminding us.62
After constituting themselves as countries, some nations, like Switzerland
or Chile, have been relatively peaceful and did not make war on their
neighbors or seek to expand their borders,63 while others behaved more
aggressively toward their neighbors or their own domestic minorities.64 But
each, even the peaceable ones, was violent in its inception-that is, in its
originary act. 65 Those nations whose originary acts were unusually violent-
overriding tacit understandings about space, for example, or local ethnic or
religious enclaves-often exhibit subsequent histories of turmoil and
phenomenon). With colonialism, of course, an outside force dictates the lines. See Tayyab
Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International
Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1
(2010) (discussing the "Durand line"); Lauren Markham, Expat, Immigrant, Migrant, Refugee:
Why 'This Land Is Our Land' No Matter the Label, N.Y. TIrES (June 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/books/review/suketu-mehta-this-land-is-our-land.html
[https://perma.cc/W664-ND8N] (book review) (noting that "forty percent of all the national
borders in the entire world today were made by just two countries: Britain and France").
61. Terra nullius is a good example. See Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1
(Austl.) (repudiating the longstanding basis for English dispossession of native land rights in
Crown territories); Rebuke, supra note 8, at 41 (discussing terra nullius and similar policies).
62. See David Flint, No Borders, No Country, SPECTATOR (Feb. 23, 2019),
https://retro.spectator.co.uk/2019/02/no-borders-no-country/ [https ://perma.cc/NJV3 -EJ3Q]
(attributing this saying to Donald Trump). Trump's absolutist view stands in tension with the idea
of dual citizenship, a status that many in the United States have traditionally enjoyed. JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 8.
63. Jennifer Latson, Switzerland Takes a Side for Neutrality, TIME (Feb. 13, 2015),
https://time.com/3695334/switzerland-neutrality-history/ [https://perma.cc/YSW5-SY3X]; Luca
Ventura, The Most Peaceful Countries in the World 2019, GLOB. FIN. (June 21, 2019),
https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/non-economic-data/most-peaceful-countries
[https://perma.cc/H36V-CJYN]; see also Rebuke, supra note 8, at 41. While Chile has not waged
war against its neighbors, like a number of South American countries, it has treated its internal
minorities, such as indigenous people or ones of African descent, in less than exemplary fashion.
Rodrigo Espinoza-Troncoso & Michael Wilson-Becerril, Opinion, What Is Behind State Violence
in Chile?, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/state-violence-
chile-191202110752549.html [https://perma.cc/SCR3-Q89Q].
64. E.g., Germany during the Nazi years, see German Exhibit Shows Appeal of Nazi
Ideology, NPR (Nov. 8, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld= 131039806
[https://perma.cc/45GZ-V4MY], or South Africa under Apartheid, see Ventura, supra note 63;
Rebuke, supra note 8, at 41-42.
65. Violence, supra note 54, at 444 46 (discussing founding acts).
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oppression of minority groups.6 6 One thinks of South Africa, 61 modem-day
Yugoslavia,68 or the U.S. during the period of westward expansion.69
1. Immigration Practice and the Role of Laws
When new nations enact laws to control their borders, this enactment
presents a second example of originary violence. For immigration laws
cannot justify themselves. Justificatory measures such as due process,
hearings, national quotas, and executive decrees follow the announcement of
the laws rather than precede them.70 This announcement arrives by fiat. We
declare the arrival of the new country and its border and rules, and let
everyone know that they are expected to go along with the new order. If they
don't, we'll try them as lawbreakers or if they are really obnoxious,
"traitors."
66. The Balkans, with their unstable borders, endless feuds and massacres of tribal enemies,
are a prime example. See, e.g., The City Star, KARLOVAC, https://www.karlovac.hr/the-city-star-
3034/3034 [https://perma.cc/3SEB-5AY6] (describing a tiny walled city that changed hands
many times owing to struggles between one empire or another over trade routes and access to a
small river); see also GEOPOLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT: THE FORTRESS EMPIRE
(Warwick Armstrong & James Anderson eds., 2007) (discussing the politics of the new internal
and external borders, largely peaceful, of the European commonwealth). On the example of the
Kashmir region, a much-disputed region on the India-Pakistan border, see, for example, Nikhil
Kumar, India Parliament Votes To Change Kashmir's Status and Give New Delhi More Control
over Contested Region, CNN (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/06/asia/india-
kashmir-union-territory-intl-hnk/index.html?ncid=newsltushpmgnews [https ://perma.cc/SGX3-
LEP9]. On the long-running disputes over national sovereignty and borders in the former
Yugoslavia, see Bla2 Zgaga, Exposing Slovenia's Dark History in the Yugoslav Conflict, INT'L
CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Mar. 3, 2014),
http s://www.icij.org/blog/20 14/03/exposing-slovenias-dark-history-yugoslav-conflict/
[https ://perma.cc/X7YH-F5V8].
67. See Rebuke, supra note 8, at 41 42.
68. See, e.g., Zgaga, supra note 66.
69. See VINE DELORA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1988) (discussing treatment of
Indians during Westward expansion and afterward); infra note 86 and accompanying text
(discussing the War with Mexico).
70. Violence, supra note 54, at 446 (discussing this order of priority).
71. See AaronBlake, Trump Keeps Throwing Around the Word 'Treason' Which May Not
Be a Great Idea, WASH. POST. (May 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/20 18/05/15/trump-keeps-lowering-the-bar-for-what-constitutes-treason-which-may-not-
be-a-great-idea/?utm term=.7e46d6a7ce20 [https://perma.cc/NK8H-WLTV] (discussing recent
rhetorical excesses); Whig and Tory, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Whig-Party-England [https://perma.cc/LRC5-KP74] (noting
that in the colonies, the term came to be attached to colonists who were attached to King George
and opposed the American Revolution); see also KARLOVAC, supra note 66 (where national




Naturally, we provide them with an attorney, copies of the charges against
them, and the rules we will use during their trial.2 That makes the exercise
of force appear legitimate, even consensual. With luck, everyone will
internalize the new rules ("stay out unless you have our permission") so that
we don't have to coerce them every time. They coerce themselves, believing
that in doing so they are being model citizens. 4
2. Immigration Practice and Ordinary (Consequential) Violence
The law, then, performs ordinary (consequential) violence when it
sentences someone to prison, reinforces a civil judgment, deports someone,
or demands travel papers at the border. It also does so when it holds the
threat of punishment over the heads of average citizens, even those who are
inclined to comply with its commands.6 Each of these is a case of ordinary
violence.
But, as we saw, another type of violence (originary) sets in much earlier
when a lawgiver of some kind, usually self-appointed, announces itself and
begins issuing edicts. 8 In the case of the troubled neighborhood, it occurs
when I leave a note announcing the neighborhood watch and explaining my
designs on your hedges. With immigration, it occurs when a nation tells the
rest of the world that they cannot enter its territory without asking permission
in any of a large number of very complex ways.80 If they fail to do this to our
72. Rebuke, supra note 8, at 43.
73. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin Hoare ed.,
1989 reprint) (discussing the idea of false consciousness, in which an oppressed people begin to
identify with their oppressors); see also GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
72 (Rodney Livingstone trans., Merlin Press 1971) (same); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci
and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 36 37 (1982); False Consciousness, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-
general-terms-and-concepts/false-consciousness [https://perma.cc/2UM8-QKC5] (defining the
term).
74. GRAMSCI, supra note 73; ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, supra note 73 (discussing hegemony and
false consciousness); see Rebuke, supra note 8, at 43; see also GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN
EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (discussing how easily an authoritarian leader can control consciousness in
a population); VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 71 (declaring that the authority of the state
to exert power over its citizens rests on their forgetting how contingent was the origin of that
power and how it comes cloaked with the "mystique" of special occasions and celebrations).
75. Violence, supra note 544, at 437 (discussing ordinary violence).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (highlighting how originary violence sets in when the law first announces itself and
explains its intentions, namely to rule the populace).
79. See supra notes 51 52 and accompanying text.
80. Violence, supra note 52, at 437 passim.
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satisfaction, we will order them to appear before one of our tribunals and
impose a penalty, generally either detention or removal.8' But, as with the
hedges, the purpose of doing all this pursuant to law is to conceal the initial
act of violence that accompanied the announcement and persuade ordinary
citizens to go along with it.82 If they do not, we explain to them that they must
put on an orange jumpsuit and live in a detention center.83 Their family
members will grieve and reconcile themselves to life without them.84 Other
appalling consequences can ensue, all perfectly legal, in cases of the second
kind of violence-the ordinary or consequential kind.85 But in every such
case, most of us will consider it a matter of due process. After all, he was
"illegal."
C. How Originary Violence Foreshadows the Other Kind
To see how fluid borders can be in a state of nature and how ones that are
violent in the originary sense (i.e., enactment) very often turn violent later
(ordinary violence), consider three xamples from U.S. history, two from the
mid-1800s, the other very recent.
1. "America's Wicked War" and Its Consequences
Prior to the outbreak of war with Mexico, the border between the two
nations had been in dispute.8" In a mood for expansion, President Polk sent a
detachment of U.S. troops to a disputed region between two rivers.87 When
the Mexican Army obligingly opened fire on them, several columns of U.S.
soldiers drove their way to Mexico City, slaughtering as they went.88 On
arriving there, they dictated peace terms requiring Mexico to cede roughly
81. See generally id.
82. See generally id.
83. See generally id.
84. Id. at 437 (noting that most citizens, on learning what the law is, immediately concede
its authority); see MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980) (describing power as
circulating among lives and bodies, as in a system of capillaries, but always requiring a space and
boundaries); VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 81; see also JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 7
(calling attention to border-drawing as an exercise of power).
85. See Part III.C, immediately following.
86. See Richard Delgado & Juan Perea, Racial Templates, 112 MICH. L. REv. 1133, 1133
(2014) (discussing the pre-war period and the outbreak). Even earlier, the border was informal
and fluid, with a lot of unremarked crossing. See supra notes 14, 33, 35; infra, notes 131 133.
87. Delgado & Perea, supra note 86, at 1133 40.
88. Id. at 1133.
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one-half of its territory to the United States, including all of California and
much of present-day New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and Colorado. 8 9
America's "wicked war" left a residue of hard feelings. Mexican
schoolchildren learn to call it "the mutilation,"90 and even within the ceded
territory, the new Mexican-Americans fared poorly, denied first-class
citizenship by the U.S. authorities9' and subjected to land grabs by greedy
Yanquis and unscrupulous attorneys and land agents.92 Today, Latinos are the
largest minority of color and in many ways, the most marginalized and
disadvantaged.93 Unlike the Italians, Irish, Greeks, and other immigrant
groups that have risen up the ladder in successive generations, Latinos,
especially Mexican-Americans, seem mired at the bottom.
Contributing mightily to the present state of the undocumented Latino in
the United States was NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement),
which in 1994 allowed for the free movement of goods and capital between
the United States, Canada, and Mexico.94 What it did not address was labor-
specifically rural workers whose small farm livelihood could not compete
with imported foodstuffs from the North; this, in turn, precipitated the influx
of millions of Mexicans, without the freedom of movement or legal status, to
cross and re-cross the U. S.-Mexico border to seek employment.
95
89. See Juan Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing the
Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 284 85 (2003) (discussing the territorial
accession).
90. Tim Weiner, Mexico City Journal; Of Gringos and Old Grudges: This Land is Their
Land, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/09/world/mexico-city-
journal-of-gingos-and-old-grudges-this-land-is-their-land.html [https://perma.cc/S8HT-PFCR]
(discussing long-simmering resentment over Yankee encroachment).
91. See JUAN PEREA ET AL., LATINOS AND THIE LAW 8 14 (2008) (discussing the residue of
the War, including the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo that ended it); Guadalupe T. Luna,
Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a "Naked Knife ", 4
MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998) (same).
92. PEREAETAL., supra note 91, at 23 36 (discussing land claims).
93. Hispanics in the United States Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/us/hispanics-in-the-u-s-/index.html [https://perma.cc/5YWZ-
24AA]; see also UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001, at
15, 141-42 (2001), http ://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/262/hdr 2001 en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BHY9-4WA6] (providing human development indexes for African Americans
and Hispanic Americans that would place them, if they were nations, 46th in the world and 68th
in the world, respectively).
94. Maria Josefina Saldafna-Portillo, In the Shadow of NAFTA: Y Tu Mami Tambidn
Revisits the National Allegory of Mexican Sovereignty, 57 AM. Q. 751, 753 (2005).
95. See id. at 753, 756; BENDER, supra note 4, at 3, 114 30 (discussing the role of labor
supply and demand in border crossings and regulation).
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2. Hard Times in the South and Southwest
By the mid-1990s, Latinos, most of them from Mexico, began migrating
to the South in large numbers.96 The weather was mild and familiar, and jobs
were plentiful in industries such as food preparation, construction, and
agriculture.9' Southern business leaders welcomed the new arrivals, but the
men in the street did not, prevailing on their legislatures to enact harsh laws
penalizing practically anything that an unauthorized entrant might want to
do.98 Some communities engaged in "roundups" of Mexican-looking people;
many of whom were citizens.99 By 2012 or so, the immigrant population of
most of these states was in sharp decline, with many moving to greener
pastures elsewhere.'00
Why would the citizens of a labor-strapped region turn against a group
that promised (and for a short time delivered) economic salvation? Recent
studies link the harsh attitude to a period just before the Civil War, when
southern militia attempted to counter growing Yankee political might by
privately funded expeditionary forces that attempted to conquer Latin
American and Caribbean countries with the aim of creating new states, which
would of course be pro-slavery. 101
During this expeditionary or "filibuster" period, Southern newspapers,
civil organizations, and speakers whipped up public animosity toward Latin
American nations with the aim of justifying the movement to seize control
over them. 102 Fighting and disputes over sovereign control thus left a residue
96. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Southern Dreams and a New Theory of First
Amendment Legal Realism, 65 EMORY L.J. 305, 334 36 (2014) (discussing this period and the
lead-up to it).
97. Id. at 335. See also Saldafna-Portillo, supra note 94 (discussing reasons for increased
rates of migration to the United States from Mexico).
98. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 96, at 318, 336 (discussing Alabama's anti-immigrant
statute, HB 56, and noting Arizona's similar statute, SB 1070).
99. Id. at 338; see also JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 110 (describing one such roundup in
Chandler, Arizona in 1997).
100. Pamela Constable, Alabama Law Drives Out Illegal Immigrants but Also Has
Unexpected Consequences, WASH. POST (June 17, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/alabama-law-drives-out-illegal-immigrants-but-also-
has-unexpected-consequences/2012/06/17/gJQA3Rm0jV story.html [https ://perma.cc/9A68-
8ZTH].
101. ROBERT E. MAY, THE SOUTHERN DREAM OF A CARIBBEAN EMPIRE, 1854-1861 (1973)
(discussing the expeditionary or filibustering period); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 96, at
324 32.
102. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 96, at 327 29.
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of ill will toward brown-skinned people that made it seem natural to
marginalize and burden them with unfair laws a century later.'03
3. Trump's Anti-Immigrant Laws
Even more recently, the Trump administration has been whipping up
fervor among its base by inveighing against Latino immigrants, whom he
terms rapists and murderers out to lead lives of luxury in the U.S. supported
by lavish welfare payments funded by unwitting U.S. taxpayers. 104 Among
the measures his administration has enacted are family separation,10 5 travel
bans,'0 6 detention facilities with grossly substandard living conditions,'0° and
sharp cutbacks on asylum.108 His drumbeat of anti-immigrant rhetoric has
caused a predictable rise in nativism,'0 9 bullying in schools,"0 police
harassment,"' and hate crime. 112
103. Id. at 344 46 (tracing how this animus survived in Southern song, literature, myth, and
even roadside signs for more than a century).
104. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11, at 292 94 (discussing Trump's harsh policy).
Trump also revised NAFTA to make it even more punitive and one-sided; see Stan Greenberg,
Opinion, Trump Promised a New Trade Policy. But His New NAFTA Might Be Worse than the
Old One, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019),
https ://www.washingtonpost.com/opirions/20 1 9/04/10/trump-promised-new-trade-policy-his-
new-nafta-might-be-worse-than-old-one/ [https://perma.cc/596F-PFN3] (same).
105. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11, at 299.
106. Id. at 292.
107. Id. at 299.
108. Id. at 292.
109. Id. at 294.
110. Rosemary Sword & Philip Zimbardo, The Trump Effect: An Update, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-time-cure/20180 1/the-trump-
effect-update [https://perma.cc/WDJ5-MVBD] (discussing fallout from Trump's acts).
111. Press Release, Latino Justice, National Poll Shows Latinos Are Concerned About Police
Violence, Feel Less Safe Under Trump but Insist on Increased Spending on Rehabilitation Instead
of More Funding for Prisons or Police (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.latinojustice.org/es/news/national-poll-shows-latinos-are-concerned-about-police-
violence-feel-less-safe-under-trump [https://perma.cc/B86N-GRDY].
112. Griffin Sims Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President Trump's Election on
Hate Crimes (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102652
[https://perma.cc/SVD3-GKAR] (observing that hate crimes are increasing). Trump's unusually
violent behavior toward immigrants thus provides a prime example of how originary violence
(here, the War with Mexico ending in an unfair treaty under which Mexico lost nearly half its
land) trickles down in the form of ordinary violence, even years later. Even though the originary
kind targets nations-usually weaker ones-and ordinary violence individuals, the first sets up
conditions that often lead to the second in a form of trickle-down retribution.
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4. Tackling Isolated Examples of Consequential Violence: The
Missionary Complex and the Frequent Rescuer
If the current system of highly fortified borders is both unjustified and
senseless, one might ask why scholars and activists do not attack it frontally.
Many hasten to the defense of those who are detained in appalling conditions
or rise to challenge obstacles that the administration places in the way of those
seeking asylum."3 Others deplore the failure of the immigration system to
provide counsel to those charged with immigration offenses or accuse ICE of
heavy-handed tactics in attempting to locate and detain those who are here
without authorization."4 But few question the system itself that visits these
cruelties. Might it be because "fighting the power" is arduous and may easily
damage one's career, while taking the part of the benevolent rescuer feels
good and evokes admiration? We are reminded of the story of two friends
who were walking along a river."' Spotting a baby floating downstream in a
basket, both friends waded into the river and rescued it."6 After setting it
safely on the bank, they noticed a second baby in a basket, then a third. "
They rescued both. On spotting a fourth drifting downstream, one of the
friends set off determinedly upstream. The remaining friend asked, "Here
comes another one. Aren't you going to help me rescue it?" To which the
other replied, "I'll be back. But first, I want to find out who is putting all those
babies in the river.""1
8
The point of the allegory is that sometimes one must consider the frame
inside which iniquitous acts take place, and not just the individual acts
113. E.g., Anneliese Hermann, Asylum in the Trump Era, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 13,
2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/20 18/06/1 3/4 52025/asylum-
trump-era/ [https://perma.cc/RFM5-4D8U]; Mary Papenfuss, Appalling Conditions in Immigrant
Child Centers Akin to 'Torture Facilities,' Doctor Says, HUFFPOST (June 24, 2019),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/torture-facilities-immigrant-children-detention-dolly-lucio-
sevier n 5dl1623fe4b07ae90da2393b [https://perma.cc/D6RR-FEHX].
114. Ahilan Arulanantham, Immigrant Children Do Not Have the Right to an Attorney Unless
They Can Pay, Rules Appeals Court, ACLU (Feb. 6, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/deportation-and-due-process/immigrant-children-
do-not-have-right-attorney [https://perma.cc/B6AL-XU7R]; Caitlin Dickerson & Zolan Kanno-
Youngs, Thousands Are Targeted as ICE Prepares To Raid Undocumented Migrant Families,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/us/politics/ice-families-
deport.html [https://perma.cc/U98D-F8AD].
115. Cf Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the
Case for 'Impermanence', 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 405 n.2 (2005) (depicting the "The Parable of






themselves. The next section (Part IV) counters a powerful argument on
behalf of that very same frame. Part VI proposes a new frame that lacks many
of the drawbacks of the current one.
IV. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE INHABITANTS OF A REGION HAVE A RIGHT
To DETERMINE WHO MAY ENTER
Recently, philosophical thought has offered a seemingly powerful rebuttal
to the idea of open borders. It is that those living in a region have a right,
based on the freedom of association, to determine who is fit to live there. 119
Since an outsider is not a current member of the community in question, he
or she cannot insist upon this right. At best, this person has a right to travel.
But the would-be immigrant could just as easily travel in a different direction,
including inside his or her own homeland. Hence, the idea that he or she
should be free to travel across another country's borders and take up
residence there stands on a very weak foundation.
This argument is similar to one that Herbert Wechsler levelled against
Brown v. Board of Education.120 In an article entitled Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, Wechsler reasoned that "if the freedom of
association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
those to whom it is ... repugnant."'121 And given a choice "between denying
the association to those who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid
it," he was unable to find a principle that would justify preferring the one over
the other. 1
22
History has not treated this argument kindly. Many pointed out that the
right of a black child to attend an integrated school supersedes by far the right
of a white parent to send his kids to a school that is all-white.123 Much the
same would hold true with respect to borders. The right of a nation to exclude
119. See CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & PHILIP COLE, DEBATING THE ETHiCS OF
IMMIGRATION: IS THERE A RIGHT TO EXCLUDE? 2 3, 13, 155 (2011) (discussing the pros and cons
of a right to exclude immigrants); see also SONG, supra note 54, at 56 82 (arguing that
sovereignty is necessary to statehood and includes the right to close borders, opening them only
to those it chooses).
120. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 32 34 (1959); see Brownv. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. Wechsler, supra note 120, at 1, 34.
122. Id. at 34 35. But see Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (noting that white self-interest ("interest
convergence") supplied the missing principle).
123. See Stanley Fish, When Principles Get in the Way, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/shattering/sfish.html [https://perma.cc/EZ9M-GQU3] (discussing fallacies
inherent in the neutral principles argument).
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nonwhite immigrants, for example, would smack of racism24 and would,
under almost any conceivable political theory,125 be entitled to less respect
than the right of a traveler to seek entry, particularly for the purpose of
securing asylum. 1
26
Does that do justice to the philosopher's claim? Perhaps discrimination in
connection with entry is not based on skin color at all (highly reprehensible
and hard to justify), but economics and culture (where the case is arguably
stronger). To evaluate this suggestion, let us compare the border with Mexico
to the Canadian one.
V. AN EXAMPLE: THE U.S. BORDER WITH CANADA
The border between these two countries is not antagonistic or violent but
based on a degree of trust and friendliness. 127 Except for the Chinese during
an earlier period, skin color seems to play little role in determining the ability
of a Canadian traveler to cross in order to visit family or friends or perform a
brief errand.28 Black Canadians cross readily to U. S. border towns, and Black
Americans do the same in the opposite direction.129 The two regions often
work cooperatively on necessary repair or construction of common
124. See IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Juan Perea ed., 1997) (discussing the role of race and racism in the opposition
to immigration).
125. Behind Rawls' veil of ignorance (see supra note 32), for example, most of us, if unaware
whether we would be white or nonwhite, would opt for freedom of travel. By the same token,
policymakers bent on maximizing act or rule utility would opt for nondiscriminatory and
relatively open borders to promote cultural variety and strong labor markets.
126. See Asylum & The Rights of Refugees, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CTR.,
https://ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/ [https://perma.cc/KH98-Z8MG] (reviewing international
conventions and cases declaring the high place this right holds in the law of nation); see also Greg
Sargent, Opinion, Trump's Latest Tweetstorm Is Worse than It Appears, WASH. POST (Apr. 2,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2 0 18/04/02/trumps-latest-
unhinged-tweetstorm-is-worse-than-it-appears/ [https://perma.cc/JG4Z-N4BL] (noting that "law
and popular culture have come to accept that asylum seekers are unlike other unauthorized
migrants," in accordance with "humanitarian obligations" that are rooted in post-World War II
international conventions and norms, and attributing the remark to Professor Hiroshi Motomura).
127. See DOROTHEE SCHNEIDER, CROSSING BORDERS: MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 88 (2011) (discussing border relations with Canada).
128. Id. at 69, 91 (observing that he Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 for many years barred
almost all immigration from China into the United States. Thus, the U.S. Bureau of Immigration
examined all immigrants arriving by train at U.S.-Canada railway border crossings to determine




infrastructure projects such as bridges and roadways.3 ° Many secondary
roads leading into and out of Canada are unguarded, a simple sign marking
the end of one country and the start of another. 3'
One likely reason for this relatively tranquil border, compared to the one
with Mexico, lies simply in the different circumstances of their creation or
origination. To put it plainly, the Mexican border has often been a site of
contestation.' Like the Balkans or other troubled areas, it has a history
replete with originary violence;'33 the Canadian border does not. 13 4 Of course,
other differences mark the two boundaries. The one with Mexico ends a
Spanish-speaking region and starts an English-speaking one; the one with
Canada does not. The region ending at the border with Mexico traces its
culture, history, and law to Spain, the other (U.S. and Canada) traces theirs
to England and France. Still, the main differences seem rooted in struggle,
war, and turmoil: originary violence, in short. Without that, they might
resemble the borders between, say England, Scotland, and Wales, or
Venezuela and Brazil, relatively peaceable borders among longtime
friends. 15
In short, the U.S. border with Mexico has been chaotic, confused, and
marked with violence and contention for some time. The one with Canada
has not. What lessons can we draw from these diverging experiences?
VI. MODIFYING BORDER POLICY EXPERIMENTALLY: A STATE-BY-STATE
APPROACH
If one state, such as California, introduced a new, consensual border policy
along the lines described above, it is very likely to prove successful. Because
the degree of originary violence surrounding its enactment would be low,
130. E.g., Project Profile: Gordie Howe International Bridge, U.S. DEPT. TRANSP.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/projectprofiles/mi gordie howe int bridge.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6YQD-FLXG] (discussing one such large joint project).
131. John Dankowsky, Travelling Along America's 'Forgotten Border,' NPR (Sept. 28,
2018), https ://www.wnpr.org/post/traveling-along-americas-forgotten-border
[https://perma.cc/K7AK-VLF3]; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 127, at 89.
132. SCHNEIDER, supra note 127, at 95 96.
133. Id. at 95; see also BENDER, supra note 4 (discussing crime and drug dealing in this
region). But see Lim, supra note 14 (noting that very early in the two countries' history, the border
between the two was informal and porous, and not policed at all rigorously).
134. SCHNEIDER, supra note 127, at 89 93.
135. Id. at 93 96. On the late nineteenth century attempt to establish the western end of the
U.S. border with Mexico, see INT'L BOUNDARY COMM'N OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO,
REPORT OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION UPON THE SURVEY AND RE-MARKING OF THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO WEST OF THE RIO GRANDE, 1891 1896 (1898).
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populations on both sides are unlikely to resent it. The two regions could
probably police their border with a relative lack of weaponry or fortifications.
California might even offer to extend any such new regime to adjacent U.S.
states, such as Nevada and Oregon. The new arrangement might, in turn,
motivate those other states to seek agreements with their neighbors on other
sides. Oregon might wish to make immigration easy for Canadians willing to
teach math and science in grade schools or Mexicans capable of serving as
fire fighters during the fire season. Nevada might want to facilitate settlement
in small hamlets in danger of turning into ghost towns. By the same token,
Mexico might opt to make border crossing easy for Americans from any of
those states interested in enjoying retirement in a peaceful village or opening
a business or school.3 6 The border between the United States and Mexico is
already integrated, culturally and economically, especially in regions such as
El Paso. 137 The proposal outlined here would allow it to become even more
so.
138
136. See Richard Delgado, A U.S.-Mexican Law School for Deportees, 70 FLA. L. REV. F.
108 (2018) (discussing one such proposal); see also Shapiro, supra note 33 (discussing how,
following the deportation of the father, a family from one U.S. city is making their home and a
decent living in a distant Mexican city where their young American-looking children are attending
public schools and learning to be bilingual).
137. See, e.g., Escobar, supra note 33.
138. On states as laboratories of invention, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also LIm, supra note 14 (same). In the regime outlined
above, the border with Mexico would revert somewhat in the direction of the regime that prevailed
early in the countries' histories, when passage back and forth was fluid, informal, and not
rigorously policed. For the argument that "mestizo democracy," in which immigrant and native
cultures mix and blend, would improve both freedom and democracy anywhere in the United
States that proved willing to try it, see JOHN FRANCIS BURKE, MESTIZO DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF CROSSING BORDERS (2002). If California renders its border with Mexico
consensual its terms agreeable to both its own citizens and to Mexico the new border regime
would presumably be much less violent, in both senses (originary and ordinary) than it is now.
Would this mean that California merely shifts the violence that formerly attended its border, to
other states so that their borders became more violent? Probably not. If, as we suspect, California
prospers because of the new energy, labor, and culture of the newcomers, other states are apt to
follow its example, to everyone's good even, perhaps, Arizona, which until recent has been
virulently anti-Mexican. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic
Studies, Book Traffickers (Librotraficantes), and a New Type ofRace Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513
(2013). If Mexico were cautious, it might propose that Baja California try out the new
arrangement first and see how it worked out. Since the basis for the agreements we have been
describing is contractual the theory being consent three-way agreements should be
theoretically possible, just as they are in the world of corporate contracting.
Above, we posited that states on either side of California are unlikely to resent its experiment
with consensual borders between itself and Mexico. But might the federal government resent the
arrangement? Possibly so, especially under a regime like Donald Trump's. After all, the move
from federal regulation of immigration to regulation by the individual states could seem jarring,




Could the U.S. border with Mexico ever be as peaceful as, for example,
that with Canada? In terms of originary violence, the two stand on quite
different footings, so that the greater degree of turbulence surrounding the
former should come as no surprise. But many border regions, such as El Paso,
are relatively happily integrated, even if on a federal level the two nations are
often at each other's throats. This article puts forward a new basis for cross-
border political relationships, namely that the states and regions on both sides
be permitted and urged to draw up the terms of their own relationship, such
as who can enter and remain and for how long. Consensual borders would
reduce violence of two kinds and would enable regions to take advantage of
talent, labor, skill, and culture available close at hand, to the benefit of all.
in charge of immigration, it might ask; the U.S. government has been in charge of this area for
much of our history. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into foreign treaties or alliances).
State regulation of admission and removal would thus seem to require an explanation. But this
article has offered several reasons in support of such an experiment. For the reader who might
like California's negotiated border arrangement, but not one like South Carolina's, our answer is
that federal preemption would seem to block any effort by a state to introduce an immigration
regime harsher than the current one. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). And, in any
event, if South Carolina proposed a set of onerous terms ("send us just your light-skinned
Mexicans," or "just ones who speak English with a Southern accent"), Mexico would be free to
reject them, probably indignantly.
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